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The volume of tax work done by the United States Supreme Court
at the last term remained at the peak characteristic of recent years."
The range of decision, however, was unusually narrow. Federal
taxes claimed the major share of the Court's attention. More than
two-thirds of the cases decided at the 194o Term fell into this category.
Of these, thirty-three involved the federal income tax; six, the federal
gift tax; three, the federal estate tax; and two processing taxes. The
remaining cases dealt with state taxes. Eight decisions involved the
commerce clause, of which three also raised problems of jurisdiction to
tax. There were eight cases on jurisdiction to tax, counting the three
involving the commerce clause. There was one case on the immunity of
the United States from state taxes, one relating to the contracts clause
of the Federal Constitution, and four bankruptcy cases, which to some
extent involved state taxes.
There were no changes in personnel at the 194o Term. Mr. Justice McReynolds retired, but his place was not filled until the work of
the term was over. At the end of the term Chief Justice Hughes retired, and Mr. Justice Stone was elevated to his place. At the same
time Senator Byrnes of South Carolina, and the Attorney General,
- A. B., 1923, Georgetown University; LL. B., 1926, S.J. D., 1931, Harvard University; member of the New York, North Carolina and District of Columbia Bars;
Professor of Law, Duke University; author of The Tax Deciions of the Supreme
Court, 1938 Term (i939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REV. i; Taxation and the Supre.me Court,
x937 Term; (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1, 165; and of other articles in legal periodicals.
i. Excluding orders and petitions for certiorari and rehearing, and counting as
single cases opinions where several cases were consolidated and disposed of at the same
time, sixty-three tax cases were decided at the 194o Term.
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Robert H. Jackson, were named associate justices. This means, of
course, that with the solitary exception of Mr. Justice Roberts, all of
the present members of the Court owe their positions to the present
administration and the current political philosophy.
From the point of view of taxation, the quality of the present
Court is painfully clear. Opinions differ as to whether it is a genuinely
liberal court. The cold facts of the record leave no room for argument, however, that it is an extremely governmental-minded court.
This was emphasized by the tax cases at the last term. The taxpayer's
chances of prevailing before the Supreme Court were approximately
ten per cent. Of the sixty-three cases decided, the taxpayer won in
seven. Only once did the Court find a tax unconstitutional. In but six
cases could it be persuaded to dissent from the construction placed upon
tax laws by the administrative agencies charged with their enforcement.
A review of a group of decisions as diverse as the tax cases decided
by the Supreme Court at a given term presents baffling problems of
classification and emphasis. The desire for some degree of dramatic
unity inclines one to relegate federal taxation to the status of a subtopic under the general heading taxation. With this initial bias, it is
easy to take the next step of unduly magnifying the state tax cases, because they involve constitutional issues, while gliding swiftly, almost
contemptuously, over federal cases, which present mere problems of
construction. Analytically, this may be defensible. From a practical
point of view, however, it has less to commend it. Federal taxation has
easily achieved the stature of an independent subject, complete in itself.
Its points of contact with the state tax cases are relatively limited and
accidental. The tax decisions of the Supreme Court divide naturally
into those dealing with federal taxes and those involving state taxes.
At the last term not only quantitatively, but qualitatively, the more important part of the Court's tax work was in the field of federal taxation. Without consciously slighting the state tax cases, several of which
are of first-rate importance, the bulk of this paper will be devoted to an
analysis of the federal cases as a separate topic, and in the approximate
detail their significance merits.
I. FEDERAL TAXES
A. The FederalIncome Tax
I. Income

Because of the fact that the income tax is a progressive tax, the
possessor of a large income who can divide it into several smaller
incomes, achieves a substantial tax saving. One method of doing this,
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which has, however, been rather effectively discouraged by specific provisions of the Revenue Acts, as well as judicial legislation, is to divert a
portion of one's income to a legal alter ego, like a corporation or a
trust.2 Another method is to make an assignment of income or income-

producing property. Although not specifically covered by legislation,
the effectiveness of this device has been considerably impaired by recent
judicial definitions of taxable income.
In Helvering v. Horst,3 for example, Horst owned certain coupon
bonds. Shortly before the coupons fell due, he detached them from
the bonds and gave them to his son, who proceeded to collect them in
the same tax year as that in which the gifts were made. The Supreme
Court held that the income from the coupons was taxable to the father,
the assignor, rather than to the son, the assignee. Mr. Justice Stone,
who spoke for the majority, said that the owner of a bond has rights
to receive both principal and interest. When he gives away the coupons he exercises his right to interest and experiences an economic
satisfaction which results in the realization of taxable income. In the
Justice's own words, "Even though he never receives the money, he
derives money's worth from the disposition of the coupons which he
has used as money or money's worth in the procuring of .a satisfaction
which is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's
worth.

.

.

.

The power to dispose of income is the equivalent of

ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of
income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the
income by him who exerciseg it." 4
Mr. Justice McReynolds could not assent to Mr. Justice Stone's
reasoning. He declared that the coupons were "independent negotiable
instruments, complete in themselves. Through the gift they became
at once the absolute property of the donee, free from the donor's control and in no way dependent upon ownership of the bonds." 5 Since
"no question of actual fraud or purpose to defraud the revenue" was
"presented," 6 he concluded that there was no basis for taxing the receipts from the coupons to the donor. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Roberts joined in Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent.
There are several points worth noting in connection with Mr.
Justice Stone's opinion. It is familiar doctrine that income may be
realized through the discharge of an obligation as well as the actual
2. See Rudick, The Problem of PersonalIncome Tax Avoidance (940)
& CONTEMP. PROD. 243, 255-256, 258-260.
3. 311 U. S. 112 (194o), (194i) 89 U. op P,. L. REv. 532.

4. 311 U. S. 112, 117, x8 (1940).

5. Id. at 121.
6. Ibid.
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receipt of a tangible benefit. 7 Moreover, as far as the Sixteenth
Amendment is concerned income may be realized by the discharge of
a moral or social, as well as a strictly legal, obligation., In support of
his position that the assignor realized income in the Horst case, Mr.
Justice Stone cited the cases where income has been held to be realized
through the discharge of an obligation. He also declared that "although the donor here, by the transfer of the coupons, has precluded
any possibility of his collecting them himself, he has nevertheless, by
his act, procured payment of the interest as a valuable gift to a member of his family." 9 It might seem from this portion of his opinion
that the basis of taxing the assignor in the Horst case was that the
assigned income was used to discharge a family obligation, or was at
least kept under the assignor's dominion in his family, so that it was
still his income in line with the reasoning in Helvering v. Clifford.1 0
From the opinion as a whole, however, it seems clear that the purpose
for which the coupons were assigned, or the person to whom they were
assigned, was immaterial. The assignor realized income, not because
he discharged a family obligation or made a gift to a member of his
family, but because he made a gift of income, while still retaining the
right to the principal which produced the income.
From an analytical point of view it is a little difficult to see why
a man should realize income where he gives away the right to income
and retains the ownership of the principal which produces the income,
and yet fail to do so, where he gives away both the rights to income
and principal. If, for example, the assignor in the Horst case had
given not only the coupons, but the bonds as well, he would not have
realized any income when the coupons were collected by his son. It is
obvious, however, that he has exercised the "power to procure the payment of income to another," which Mr. Justice Stone said resulted in
a realization of income. The fact that he also exercised a power to procure the payment of principal to another can scarcely negative this.
Another peculiarity about Mr. Justice Stone's opinion is chronological. Presumably the point at which the assignor in the Horst case
experienced the satisfaction which resulted in his realizing income was
when he gave away the coupons. Yet, according to Mr. Justice Stone,
the assignor realized income, not when he gave away the coupons, but
when they were collected. It is true that the precise time when income
was realized in the Horst case was not critical since the coupons were
given away and collected in the same tax year. In later cases, however,
7. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U. S. 716 (1929) ; Douglas v. Wilcuts,

296 U. S. 1 (1935).

8. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 67o (1933).
9. 311 U. S. 112, 117 (1940).
10. 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
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where the gifts of income and collection by the donee did not coincide,
it was held that income was realized by the donor when the assigned
income was collected, rather than when the assignment took place."
Helvering v. Eubank 12 involved the same type of problem as Helvering v. Horst. Eubank had been an insurance agent. After his
agency terminated he was still entitled to certain commissions on policies which he had sold. He made irrevocable assignments of these
commissions and the question arose whether, when they were collected,
they were taxable to him or to his assignee. The Court, again speaking
through Mr. Justice Stone, held upon the authority of Helvering v.
Horst, that the commissions were taxable to the assignor. Mr. Justice
Stone was content to rest upon the authority of that decision without
further amplification of principle. Mr. Justice McReynolds, however,
once more set forth, in terms which merit repetition, his reasons for
disagreeing with the majority. "The assignment in question," he said,
"denuded the assignor of all right to commissions thereafter to accrue
under the contract with the insurance company. He could do nothing
further with respect to them; they were entirely beyond his control.
In no proper sense were they something either earned or received by
him during the taxable year. The right to collect them became the absolute property of the assignee without relation to future action by the
assignor. A mere right to collect future payments for services already
performed is not presently taxable as 'income derived' from. such services. It is property which may be assigned. Whatever the assignor
receives as consideration may be his income; but the statute does not
undertake to impose liability upon him because of payments to another
under a contract which he has transferred in good faith, under circumstances like those here disclosed." I8 Again the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Roberts concurred in Mr. Justice McReynolds' dissent.
The most revealing case in connection with assigned income was
the last case decided by the Court upon this topic. In Harrisonv.
Schaffner,14 the life beneficiary of a trust assigned specified amounts
in dollars from the income of the trust for the succeeding year to her
children. The Court, again speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, and
on this occasion without dissent, held that the income collected by the
children was taxable to their mother, the assignor. In distinguishing
the Blair case, 15 where it had been held that a life beneficiary of a trust
ii. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940), (941) 89 U.
Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (94i)
12. 311 U. S. 122 (940),
('94i) 89 U. OF PA. L. RLV. 532.
13. 311 U. S. 122, 127 (1940).
14. 312 U. S. 579 (94).

I5. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).

OF PA. L. RsEv. 532;
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was no longer taxable upon income from a trust which he had assigned
to his children, Mr. Justice Stone drew a distinction between an assignment of income-producing property, which relieves the assignor from
further income tax liability, and a gift of income, which does not. He
did not purport, however, to treat this as a real distinction, resting
upon crystallized conceptions of the law of property, but simply as a
convenient rationalization of a result. The Court, said Mr. Justice
Stone, is "not so much concerned with the refinements of title as with
the actual command over the income which is taxed and the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." -6 Where an assignment represents
merely an effort to "camouflage the reality" .1 that the assignor is enjoying the benefit of the trust of which he continues to be the beneficiary, the income will be taxed to the assignor. "Nor," added the
Justice, "are we troubled by the logical difficulties of drawing the line
between a gift of an equitable interest in property for life effected by
a gift for life of a share of the income of the trust and the gift of the
income or a part of it for the period of a year as in this case. 'Drawing the line' is a recurrent difficulty in those fields of law where differences of degree produce ultimate differences in kind.

.

.

.

It is

enough that we find in the present case that the taxpayer, in point of
substance, has parted with no substantial interest in property other than
the specified payments of income which, like other gifts of income, are
taxable to the donor. Unless in the meantime the difficulty be resolved
by statute or treasury regulations, we leave it to future judicial decisions
to determine precisely where the line shall be drawn between gifts of
income-producing property and gifts of income from property of which
the donor remains the owner, for all substantial and practical purposes." 18

Harrisonv. Schaffner, of course, makes it clear that the determining factor in these cases of assigned income is the practical problem of
tax avoidance, rather than any subtle metaphysic of the exercise of the
power to direct the payment of income. A taxpayer cannot retain the
"substantial" ownership of property and escape a tax upon its fruits.
By refusing to chart a bright line between assignments of incomeproducing property and assignments of income, the Court evidenced its
awareness of the inherent difficulty of dealing with tax avoidance
schemes upon any but a strictly ad hoc basis. This is a sound judicial
tactic, despite the concomitant embarrassment to the practitioner who
is called upon to advise his clients in disposing of their property.
16.

312

U. S. 579, 58
582.

17. Id. at

18. Id. at 583, 584.

(94).
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Obviously, the situation here closely parallels that in Helvering v.
Clifford,19 upon which the Court relied in deciding the Schaffner case.
In Helvering v. Clifford, the Court pointed out that the income from
some short term trusts will be taxed to the settlors of the trusts, without committing itself to a definite specification of the factors leading to
this result, beyond the general admonition that they are trusts where
the settlor remains the substantial owner of the trust property. In
Harrisonv. Schaffner the Court took a similar line, pointing out that
assigned income will be taxed to the assignor where the assignor remains the "substantial" owner of the income-producing property.
Although the Court did not attempt to specify definitely the situations in which assigned income will be taxed to the assignor, it seems
clear that income from services and income from property are in
separate categories. An assignment of income from services appears
to be conclusively presumed to be a mere "camouflage" to avoid taxes,
and the assigned income will be taxed to the assignor. The fact that
the income is assigned irrevocably is immaterial. 20 Nor is it material
that the income is from services which have been fully completed before the assignment.2A The justice in this discrimination against
earned income is not readily peceptible. If the taxpayer, for example,
in Helvering v. Eubank, had devoted himself to planting an orchard,
he could have given the orchard away and escaped any liability for income taxation upon its fruits. But where he consecrated his energies
to selling insurance, there was no way in which he could retire and give
away the future income from his past labors so as to escape a tax upon
it. It would seem that if a person divests himself completely of control over future income, its taxability to him or his assignee should depend upon the purpose to which the income is applied, rather than upon
whether it is derived from property or the personal exertions of the
taxpayer. It is difficult to see any sound reason for taxing the income
from past services to an assignor when the assignment is complete and
irrevocable and is not used to discharge some legal, or possibly moral,
obligation of the assignor. The assignment of income from future
22
services, which was the situation in the famous case of Lucas v. Earl,
stands, of course, upon a quite different footing. The assignor by refusing to perform the services can defeat the interest of the assignee.
This is not an irrevocable assignment. Where, however, services have
been fully performed, there is no reason for treating the right to com19.
2o.
21.
22.

309 U. S. 331 (1940).

Helvering v. Eubank, 3I U. S. 122 (1940), (1941)
Ibid.
281 U. S. iii (i93o).

89 U. or PA. L. REv. 532.
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pensation for the services any differently than a bond or an interest in
a trust, or any other kind of property.
There was another decision at the last term, which, although not
involving an assignment, raised the problem of the nature of taxable
income. In Hort v. Commissioner,2 8 the taxpayer's father, after leasing part of a building to the Irving Trust Company, died, leaving the
leased premises to the taxpayer. The Irving Trust Company later decided to cancel the lease and paid the taxpayer $I4OOOO for this privilege. The question arose as to whether or not this payment constituted
taxable income. The Commissioner contended that it did. The taxpayer contended that it did not, and indeed went further and claimed
a deductible loss in the sum of $21,494.75, the alleged difference be-

tween what the Irving Trust Company paid to be relieved under the
lease and what it would have paid in rent if the lease had not been
abrogated. Ultimately the case reached the Supreme Court upon these
two questions: (i) Did the receipt of the payment for cancelling the
lease constitute income? (2) Did the taxpayer sustain a deductible loss
from the cancellation of the lease? Mr. Justice Murphy, delivering
the opinion of a unanimous Court, ruled against the taxpayer upon
both points. He pointed out that the rent from the lease would have
been income in the hands of the son and the payment for cancelling the
lease was simply a commutation of the rent due under it. It followed
that the payment for cancelling the lease was taxable as income and the
taxpayer was not entitled to deduct anything because of that portion of
the rent which he never received, since this represented merely a failure
to realize anticipated profits, rather than a destruction of capital. It is
admittedly difficult to distinguish between capital and income. As a
practical matter, however, the Court's position that upon the death of
the father the right to receive the rent from the lease did not become
capitalized so that all future payments of rent would represent a return
of capital, rather than income, was the only tenable one. Otherwise,
whenever a decedent died and left income-producing property, it could
be argued that the income from the property was no longer taxable.
2. Exempt Income
The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 24 provided that bonds issued
by joint stock land banks under the authority of the Act should be exempt from income tax. In United States v. Stewart 5 the question
arose whether this exemption was limited to interest from such bonds
23. 313 U. S. 28 (1941).
24. 39 STAT. 360 (I916), 12 U. S. C. A. § 641 (1934).
25. 311 U. S. 6o (194o).
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or extended to capital gains realized from their sale. Stewart had purchased the bonds in question when the banks issuing them were in receivership, with a view to a later disposal of them at a profit. He subsequently sold part of the bonds with their coupons and surrendered
the remainder to the receiver of the issuing bank, realizing a profit
upon both transactions. Without attempting to allocate this profit between interest and selling profit, he treated the entire gain as exempt
from the federal income tax under the terms of the Federal Farm Loan
Act of 1916 exempting "income derived" from such bonds. Over the
dissent of Mr. Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected this contention. Mr. Justice Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the Court,
said that "income derived" from the bonds meant interest, rather than
capital gains, which were derived from transactions in the bonds, rather
than the bonds themselves. He qualified this, however, by declaring
that in some cases "income derived" from bonds might be construed
more broadly depending upon the applicable context. In the circumstances of the immediate case, he found a congressional intent to limit
the exemption to interest from the bonds.
The taxpayer in United States v. Stewart also urged that he was
not taxable because he had relied in purchasing the bonds upon a circular distributed by the Farm Loan Board stating that they were completely exempt from income taxes. The Court said that this was immaterial, since the Farm Loan Board lacked power to rule upon the
exemption, and no administrative agency could estop the United States
by waiving a public right. The Court added that a casual statement of
the Secretary of the Treasury in the course of the hearing upon the Revenue Act of 1918, to the effect that the exemption of these bonds was
broader than that of liberty bonds, was not entitled to any weight, since
it did not even purport to be a discriminating analysis of the problem.
3. Capital Gains and Losses
The general definition of a capital gain or loss under the federal
income tax is a gain or loss derived from the "sale or exchange" of
capital assets.2 6 Although this is adequate for the ordinary case, there
are some situations where it encounters difficulties.

27
This was true in Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co.,

where the taxpayer's property, which had been fully depreciated for
income tax purposes, was destroyed by fire and the question arose as to
whether the insurance it received should be treated as ordinary income
or a capital gain. At this time the 1934 Act was in force, which lim26. INT. RvV. CODE, § 117

27. 313 U. S. 247 (1941).

(a)

(939).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

ited the deduction of capital losses to the amount of capital gains plus
$2,ooo. Since the taxpayer had large capital losses in the year in question, it treated the insurance money as a capital gain in order to utilize
its losses. The Commissioner, however, determined a deficiency upon
the theory that the insurance proceeds were ordinary income. His
action was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, but the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court,
however, was unanimously of the opinion that the Commissioner had
been correct, and that the insurance proceeds represented ordinary income, rather than a capital gain. In reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Murphy declared that the destruction of property and the receipt of insurance was not a sale or exchange.
"Neither term," said he, "is appropriate to characterize the demolition
of the property and subsequent compensation for its loss by an insurance company. Plainly that pair of events was not a sale. Nor can
they be regarded as an exchange, for 'exchange' as used in § 117
(d), implies reciprocal transfers of capital assets, not a single transfer
to compensate for the destruction of the transferee's asset." 28 The taxpayer had based its case on the argument that the destruction of property which is compensated for by insurance is classified under the Act
as an involuntary conversion and occurs in that portion of the statute
dealing with sales and exchanges, and is, therefore, by implication a
sale or exchange. Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out, however, that Congress had been careful to specify explicitly any transactions, apart from
ordinary sales or exchanges, which it regarded as giving rise to capital
gains or losses. The failure of Congress specifically to provide that an
involuntary conversion was such a transaction overcame any inference
to that effect from the juxtaposition of the section dealing with involuntary conversions.
Although the destruction of a capital asset by fire and the receipt
of insurance to compensate for its loss is not a capital transaction giving rise to capital gain or loss, a loss due to the foreclosure of a lien or
mortgage on a capital asset results in a capital loss to the lienor or mort29
gagor.

This was the holding of the Supreme Court in two cases.

Mr. Justice Stone, who delivered both opinions, said that when the
statute used the expression "sale" in defining capital gains or losses, it
meant involuntary as well as voluntary sales, and therefore applied to
sales in connection with foreclosure proceedings. The Court was unanimous, with the exception of Mr. Justice Roberts who dissented in both
cases.
28. Id. at 249.
29. Helvering v. Harnmel, 311 U. S. 504 (I94i) ; Electro-Chemical Engraving Co.,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 311 U. S. 513 (I94i).
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Prior to the 1934 Act, the federal income tax did not classify the
redemption of corporate securities as a sale or exchange resulting in
capital gain or loss.30 Section I17 (f) of the 1934 Act provided, however, that amounts received upon the "retirement" of bonds and other
specified corporate securities should be treated "as amounts received in
exchange therefor." In McClain v.' Commissioner,3 1 and a companion
case 3 2 disposed of by the same opinion, the question arose as to the
meaning of "retirement". In both cases the taxpayers held bonds of
debtors who had gotten into difficulties. In the McClain case, the taxpayer surrendered his bonds to the water district which had issued
them for approximately 50% of their face value. In the Thomson
case, the taxpayer surrendered debentures to the receiver of the issuer
in return for $5 for each $i,ooo debenture. In both cases the taxpayers
deducted their full losses as bad debts. The Commissioner, however,
contended that these were losses sustained upon the retirement of the
securities and must under section 117 (f) be treated as capital losses.
After conflicting Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, the contention of
the Commissioner ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court. Speaking
for a unanimous bench, Mr. Justice Roberts held that the word "retirement" was broader than redemption and covered practically any surrender of securities to the issuer or its representative. To the plea by
the taxpayer who received $5 for each $i,ooo debenture that this
treated him unfairly, since he could have refused to surrender his securities and deducted his loss in full as a bad debt, Mr. Justice Roberts
replied, "The answer is that we must apply the statute as we find it,
leaving to Congress the correction of asserted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation." 3 As a matter of fact, this is an inequality
which Congress has undertaken to ameliorate, since the current law provides that all losses in connection with corporate securities shall be
treated as capital losses. 4
4. Basis
The present provisions of the income tax provide that the basis of
property acquired from a decedent shall be its fair market value at the
date of "acquisition". 3 5 Some of the earlier Acts, while adopting the
date of acquisition as determinative in the case of realty received from
a decedent and specific bequests of personalty, provided that the basis
of other property received from a decedent should be its fair market
3o. Fairbanks v. United States, 3o6 U. S. 436 (1939).
31. 311 U. S. 527 (1941).
32. Helvering v. Thomson, 311 U. S. 527 (1941).
33. Id. at 530.
34. INT. Ray. CODE, § 23 (g) (2) (1939).
35. INT. REV. COD, § 113 (a) (5) (939).
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value at the time of "distribution".

A group of cases at the last term

undertook to allay the confusion which has arisen as to the precise
meaning of "acquisition" and "distribution".
The first of these was Maguire v. Commissioner.6 A decedent
died in 19o3 leaving a will by which he created a trust of personal
property for the taxpayer. In 1905 the executors under the will paid
over the property to be held in trust to themselves as trustees. In 1923
they distributed to the taxpayer trust property which consisted partly of
personal property belonging originally to the decedent and partly of personal property purchased by the trustees for the trust. The taxpayer
sold property from both groups in 193o and the question arose as to
what bases he should use in computing gain or loss from the sales. At
that time the 1928 Act was in force, section 113 (a) (5) of which, provided that the basis of property acquired by will or intestacy, other than
realty and personalty specifically bequeathed, should be its fair
market value at the "date of distribution to the taxpayer." Since the
trust had not been created by a specific bequest, the question arose as
to when the property had been distributed to the taxpayer. She contended that this was the date when it had been turned over to her by
the trustees. The majority of the Court, however, rejected this contention. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion, drew
a distinction between the property originally belonging to the decedent
and that purchased by the trustees. With respect to the original property, he said that it was distributed to the taxpayer, not when it was
actually paid over to her, but when it was paid over to the trustees to
hold it in trust for her. With regard to the property purchased by the
trustees, Mr. Justice Douglas said that its basis was not governed by
section 113 (a) (5). Although the taxpayer's right to the property
had its source in the provisions of a will, it was not acquired "by will
or intestacy" within the purview of section i 13 (a) (5). Consequently
its basis was determined by the general rule of section 113 (a) and was
the cost of the property to the trustees.
Helvering v. Gambrill 7 also involved the construction of section
113 (a) (5) of the 1928 Act. In addition to the question of the
proper basis of property received from a decedent, however, this case
raised the problem of how the time such property is deemed to have
been held is computed. The taxpayer was the remainderman under a
trust created by the will of his grandmother, who died in 1897. Her
executors handed over the trust property to themselves as trustees in
1898. In March, 1928, the life beneficiary died and on May 5, 1928,
36. 313 U. S. I (1941).
37. 313 U. S. II (941).
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the trustees paid over the trust property, which consisted partly of personalty belonging originally to the creator of the trust and partly of
personalty purchased by the trustees, to the taxpayer. In 193o, in February, on May 6, and in June, the taxpayer sold property from both
groups. The Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the basis of both groups of properties was their fair
market value on the date they were distributed to the taxpayer by the
trustees. They also held that the time during which the taxpayer
should be deemed to have held the property was to be computed from
the date of such distribution, with the result that the property sold in
February was not a capital asset under the 1928 Act, which required
property to be held for more than two years to constitute a capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the lower tribunals erred on both
points. Mr. Justice Douglas again delivered the opinion of the Court,
while the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts dissented. The basis
of the property, Mr. Justice Douglas said, was governed by the decision in Maguire v. Commissioner. Consequently, the basis of the
property originally belonging to the decedent was its fair market value
on the date it was handed over to the trustees by the executors. With
respect to the property purchased by the trustees, its basis was the cost
of the property to the trustees. The time during which the property
was held, Mr. Justice Douglas said, should be computed from the date
when the taxpayer acquired an interest in the property, which was the
time of the decedent's death in the case of the property originally
owned by the decedent, and the date of purchase, in the case of the property purchased by the trustees. With respect to the original property,
moreover, it was immaterial that the taxpayer initially had only a remainder. "'Property held by the taxpayer' as used in § 1OI (c)
(8), embraces not only full ownership but also any interest whether
vested, contingent, or conditional." 38 As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed
out, computing the time of holding the original property from the decedent's death means that the date which determines the time of holding
differs from that which determines its basis. This, however, was also
true in McFeely v. Commissioner,89 decided in 1935, which Mr. Justice
Douglas cited as controlling in the Gambrill case.
There was one more case involving the construction of section 113
(a) (5) of the 1928 Act. This was Helvering v. Campbell,40 which
while posing the same problems as the Maguire and Gambrill cases, advanced another step by pointing out the application of the "first in,
first out rule" to property acquired from a decedent. Helvering v.
38. Id. at iS.

39. 296 U. S. 102 (1935).
40. 313 U. S. 15 (1941).
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Campbell was really one of three cases, 41 all of which were disposed of
by the same opinion. The taxpayers in the three cases were three children of a common parent who died in 1915 leaving a will by which he
created separate trusts for each of them. One-fourth of his residuary
estate was bequeathed to trustees for his daughter, Marjorie Campbell,
with directions to apply so much of the income as should be needed for
her support to that purpose, until she reached twenty-one, and to accumulate the residue. When Marjorie attained twenty-one she was to
receive the income from the trust until she reached twenty-eight, when,
in addition, she was to receive one-half of the principal. Upon attaining thirty-five, she was to receive the remaining half.
Another portion of the testator's residuary estate was placed under a similar trust for another daughter, Dorothy Rogers, and a third
trust created for a son, Seymour Knox. The terms of Seymour's trust
differed from those created for his sisters in that he was to receive
$500,000 when he became twenty-five, one-half of the remainder of
the corpus at thirty, and the balance at thirty-five.
Marjorie Campbell became twenty-eight on July IO, 1928, and the
trustees paid over to her one-half of the principal of her trust, which
consisted of securities her father had owned, securities purchased by her
father's executors, and securities purchased by the trustees. She sold
and redeemed bonds from all three classes in 1933. In 1926 and 1927
she purchased F. W. Woolworth stock which, with dividends received
in 1927, amounted to i,ooo shares. Under the 1928 distribution from
the trustees, she received 15,ooo additional shares of the same stock,
which represented shares originally owned by her father, a subsequent
tax-free stock split-up, stock dividends and purchases by the trustees.
In 1929 she surrendered these 16,ooo shares and received in return
40,000 new shares pursuant to a split-up of the stock.

In 1933 she

sold ioooo of these shares. It was impossible to identify the shares
which she sold with any particular shares surrendered in 1929.
Dorothy Rogers received part of the corpus of her trust in 1924
when she was twenty-eight, and part on August 6, 1931, when she was
thirty-five. During 1933 she sold some of these securities; those sold
included securities originally owned by her father, others purchased by
her father's executors, and still others purchased by the trustees.
Seymour Knox was thirty on September I, 1928. On that date
the trustees paid over to him half of the corpus of his trust, including
8,575 shares of Maine Share Corporation, of which 5,i6o shares had
been purchased by the trustees on August 3, 1927, and 3,415 shares
had been purchased by them on August 20, 1928. Seymour later ex41. Helvering v. Kiwx and Helvering v. Rogers were the other two cases.
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changed these shares in a non-taxable transaction and sold the shares
received on the exchange on June io, I93O.
The Board of Tax Appeals and the Circuit Court of Appeals held:
(i) that the basis of the securities distributed to the various cestuis que
trust was their market value at the date of distribution; (2) that the
time during which Seymour held the Maine Share Corporation stock
was to be computed from the date he received this stock from the trustees; and (3)that Marjorie in determining what shares of F. W. Woolworth stock she had sold should treat the shares she had purchased
herself as having been sold prior to those received from the trustees
under the rule of the "first in, first out."
The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, held that the lower tribunals had erred on all three points.
Mr. Justice Douglas again delivered the opinion of the Court, while the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts continued to dissent. The basis
of the property sold by the beneficiaries of the trusts in the case of that
originally owned by the decedent was its fair market value at the time
it was distributed to the trustees, and, in the case of the property purchased by the trustees, its fair market value at the date it was purchased
by them. With regard to the securities purchased by the executors, Mr.
Justice Douglas said that they were to be considered as property acquired by will under section 113 (a) (5) and their basis was, therefore,
their fair market value at the time when they were distributed to the
trustees.
In the case of the stock in the Maine Corporation, which the trustees had purchased for Seymour's trust, Mr. Justice Douglas said that
under Helvering v. Gaimbrill it must be deemed to have been held from
the dates when the trustees purchased it, rather than from the time
when they handed it over to Seymour.
With respect to the application of the "first in, first out" rule to
Marjorie's Woolworth stock, Mr. Justice Douglas said that it is the
date of acquisition which is controlling. Therefore, since she acquired
the stock distributed to her by the trustees at the date of her father's
death, this stock must be deemed to have been sold before that which
she herself purchased.
In these cases Mr. Justice Douglas stressed the point which was
developed more fully in a later decision, that the basis of property received from a testamentary trust is not affected by whether the interest
of the beneficiary is vested or contingent. On this point, for example,
he said in Helvering v. Campbell: "We are not concerned here with the
question as to when the transfers took effect for purposes of the estate
tax. As we indicated in Maguire v. Commissioner, supra, we are deal-
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ing only with a point of reference and a standard of value for determination of gains or losses realized on subsequent sales of property
acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance. For that purpose distinctions between vested and contingent remainders or between absolute
and conditional property interests have no relevancy." 42
The final case in this group, Helvering v. Reynolds,43 further emphasized the fact that the basis of property acquired from a decedent is
not affected by whether the taxpayer's interest is vested or contingent.
Helvering v. Reynolds differed from its predecessors in that it involved
section 113 (a) (5)

of the 1934 Act, rather than section 113 (a) (5)

of the 1928 Act. Under the 1934 Act, as under the current law, the
basis of property received from a decedent is its fair market value at
the date of acquisition, regardless of whether the property is realty or
personalty, or is or is not specifically bequeathed. The question then in
Helvering v. Reynolds was not when the property was distributed to the
taxpayer, but when it was acquired by him. In this case the taxpayer's
father at his death in 1918 had created a testamentary trust under
which the taxpayer took a contingent interest. On April 4, 1934, the
trustees distributed securities from the trust to the taxpayer. Some of
these had originally belonged to the decedent, and some had been purchased by the trustees. The taxpayer sold securities from both groups
in 1934, taking as his basis their fair market value when he received
them from the trustees. The Commissioner determined a deficiency
contending that as far as the securities which had originally belonged
to the decedent were concerned, they had been acquired by the taxpayer at his father's death, and their proper basis was, therefore, their
market value at that date. With respect to the securities purchased by
the trustees, the Commissioner claimed that their basis was the cost of
the securities to the trustees. The Board of Tax Appeals sustained the
Commissioner. The Circuit Court of Appeals on the other hand
agreed with the taxpayer and reversed the Board's decision. The Supreme Court felt that the Board had decided the case correctly and
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice
Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. He said that the securities which had originally belonged to the taxpayer's father were acquired by the taxpayer when his father died, despite the fact that the
taxpayer took only a contingent interest. The term "acquisition" in
the context of section 113 (a) (5) was sufficiently ambiguous to admit
of administrative interpretation and might properly be construed, as the
42. 313 U.

S. 15 21

22 (1941).

43. 313 U. S. 48 (941).
Cary v. Comm'r, 313 U. S. 441 (I94i), raised the
same problem as Helvering v. Reynolds and was decided in the same way on the authority of that decision.
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Commissioner had construed it, to cover a situation where a taxpayer
acquired only a contingent interest "which ultimately ripened into complete ownership." 4- As far as the basis of the property purchased by
the trustees was concerned, Mr. Justice Douglas held, in line with the
earlier cases, that this was not governed by section i13 (a) (5) since
that section related only to property "acquired by bequest, devise, or
inheritance." The basis of such property was, therefore, governed by
the general rule, and was its cost to the trustees.
Mr. Justice Roberts, who with the Chief Justice dissented diligently throughout this series of cases, took occasion in Helverin~g z.
Reynolds to express the reasons for his lack of concurrence more fully.
He declared that when the statute referred to the date of acquisition of
property, it meant the date when the taxpayer became the "owner of
the property; when he became able to enjoy it and dispose of it at his
will," 45 and not the time when he acquired merely a contingent interest.
5. Undistributed Profits Tax
One of the objections urged against the undistributed profits tax 4 6
was that it penalized corporations with an impaired capital which were
not allowed to distribute their current profits under local state laws, and
which could not, therefore, avail themselves of the dividend paid credit
provided for in the tax.47 A possible answer to this objection was
that such a corporation could claim that its earnings were retained under a written contract restricting it from distributing dividends and
that it was, consequently, entitled to a credit on that score. 48 The obvious difficulty with such a solution was to find the necessary written
contract. The Treasury took the position that a corporation was not
entitled to any credit under such circumstances. 49 In several cases 50
decided at the last Term the Supreme Court has finally ruled that
the Treasury's position was correct and the tax as unfair as its critics
contended.
In Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc.,5 1 a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Washington was prohibited by the laws of that state from distributing current earnings because its capital was impaired. It did not, therefore, distribute any
44. 313 U. S. 428, 433 (941).

45. Id. at 436.
46. REvENuE AcT op 1936, § I4, 49 STAT. 1648, i655 (1936).
47. Id. § 27.

48. Id. §26 (c)(i).
49. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 2-2 (1936).
5o. Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 311 U. S.46 (194o) ; CraneJohnson Co. v. Helvering, 311 U. S. 54 (940).
5. 31i U. S.46 (i94o), cited note 5o mtpra.
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dividends, but claimed that it was entitled to a credit against the undistributed profits tax on the ground that it was unable to distribute its
earnings, because of a written contract forbidding their distribution.
The corporate charter contained a provision to the effect that the corporation would abide by the laws of Washington. This in conjunction
with the state laws forbidding the distribution of earnings was alleged
to constitute the written contract restraining the distribution of dividends. The corporation also claimed that if it were denied such a credit
the undistributed profits tax, insofar as it applied to it, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, was of the unanimous opinion
that the corporation was not entitled to a credit, and that the denial of
the credit was not unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Black said that the
corporate charter was not a written contract forbidding the payment of
dividends in the sense in which this term was used in the undistributed
profits tax. "It is true, as respondent contends," he said, "that a charter has been judicially considered to be a contract insofar as it grants
rights, properties, privileges and franchises. To this extent it has been
said that an Act of Incorporation is a contract between the state and
the stockholders. But it does not follow that Congress intended to include corporate charters and related state laws in the cautiously limited
area permissible for tax credits and deductions under this section ...
Respondent's chief reliance is upon that charter provision which required that it conform to existing and future laws of Washington. But
that provision is not a grant and is not a contract.

.

. . It is clear,

therefore, that what prohibited respondent from distributing dividends
was not the provision of an executed written contract expressly dealing
with the payment of dividends. On the contrary, what prohibited respondent from paying dividends was a valid law of the State of Washington." 52

As far as the constitutionality of denying the credit was concerned,
the taxpayer had urged that this violated the Fifth, Sixteenth and
Tenth Amendments. Mr. Justice Black, however, swiftly disposed of
these objections. He dismissed the argument that there was an unconstitutional discrimination forbidden by the Fifth Amendment in allowing a credit to a corporation restrained by a written contract from paying dividends and denying it to corporations similarly restricted by
oral contracts or state laws with the terse observation that it was "without merit". "It is not necessary," he added, "to point out the many
obvious reasons which might underlie the distinction here drawn in
granting special deductions from a generally imposed tax." 53
Id. at 50, 51, 52.
53. Id. at 52.
52.
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In connection with the Sixteenth Amendment the taxpayer argued
that since its capital was impaired taxing its undistributed earnings
was a tax on capital rather than income, and was not, therefore, authorized by the amendment. Stressing the fact that the tax was on "profits
earned during a definite period-a tax year" 11 regardless of the state
of the corporation's capital, Mr. Justice Black pointed out that the tax
was really upon income and the objection on the score of the Sixteenth
Amendment was without merit.
Finally the taxpayer contended that the tax violated the Tenth
Amendment, since it interfered with the authority of the state to prescribe the powers of corporations and the conditions under which these
powers might be exercised. Mr. Justice Black retorted that the tax did
not in any way interfere with the powers of a corporation, but simply
"imposes a tax as authorized by the Sixteenth Amendment." 55
6. Deductions

-

Although the federal income tax imposes a tax upon income regardless of whether or not it is derived from a business, it will not
allow an expense connected with the production of income to be deducted, unless it is a business expense. 56 This unhappy limitation is not
only unfair; it is difficult to administer in the absence of any clear criterion as to what constitutes a business or a business expense. Prior to
the recent decision in Higgins v. Commissioner,7 it was generally assumed that quantitative factors like the continuity of his conduct, the
extent of his activities and the time he devoted to them, determined
whether a taxpayer engaged in a profit-making venture was or was not
carrying on a business. The Higgins case, however, injects a new element into the picture-a qualitative requirement that the taxpayer must
be engaged in the right kind of profit-making activity. The facts of
the case were striking.
The taxpayer had extensive investments in real estate, stocks
and bonds. In order to manage his property he maintained offices
in New York and Paris with a staff of hired assistants. These
offices conducted his financial affairs under his detailed personal
instructions. They kept records of his investments, received securities, interest and dividend checks, made deposits and forwarded
weekly and annual reports, and undertook generally the care of
his investments under his directions. For more than thirty years
the taxpayer had handled his affairs in this way. Prior to 1932
54. Id. at 53.
55. Ibid.
56. INT. Ray. CODF, § 23 (a) (1939).
57. 312 U. S. 212 (941).
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the Government had made no objection to his deducting the salaries and expenses incident to maintaining his offices. For the tax
years 1932 and 1933, however, the Commissioner refused to allow

the deductions on the ground that "mere personal investment
activities never constitute carrying on a trade or business, no matter
how much of one's time or of one's employees' time they may occupy.", 58 The taxpayer appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals. Before
the Board, the Commissioner conceded that the portions of the taxpayer's expenses referable to handling his real estate were business expenses; but, he contended, and with success, that the portions of the
expenses allocable to handling the stocks and bonds were not business
expenses. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Board and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Writing on behalf of the unanimous Court, Mr.
Justice Reed said that what constitutes carrying on a business requires
an examination of the facts in each case. The Commissioner and the
Board had decided a debatable question of fact, which it was beyond
the province of the Court to contest. "The Commissioner and the
Board," said Mr. Justice Reed, "appraised the evidence here as insufficient to establish petitioner's activities as those of carrying on a business.

.

.

.

No matter how large the estate or how continuous or

extended the work required may be, such facts are not sufficient as a
matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the decision of the
Board." '9
Although from a strictly legal point of view the Court did not
hold as a matter of law in the Higgins case that investing one's funds
in stocks and bonds cannot constitute a business, from a practical point
of view, there is no other sensible construction to put upon the decision.
This is obvious from the later decisions of United States v. Pyne 60 and
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering.A' In the Pyne case, the
executors of a large estate sought to deduct the fees paid to an attorney
for assisting them in the legal and financial aspects of the administration
of the estate, on the ground that the affairs of the estate were of such
magnitude that this was a necessary business expense. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and determined a deficiency which the
executors paid under protest and for which they later sued in the Court
of Claims. The Court of Claims found that the executors were entitled
to a refund. The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment in
favor of the executors on the ground that the lower court's legal con58. Id. at 215.
59. Id. at 218.
6o. 313 U. S. 127 (1941).
61. 313 U. S. 121 (1941).
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clusion was not sustained by proper findings of fact. Mr. Justice Black
pointed out that what constitutes carrying on a business is a question
of fact to be decided upon the evidence of each individual case. The
Court of Claims had not, however, found that the executors were
engaged in carrying on a business. They had simply found that the
decedent had been a financier and the executors were carrying on his
affairs as he would have done if he had lived. From this conclusion of
fact, which, Mr. Justice Black said, was not a conclusion that the
executors were carrying on a business, the Court of Claims had drawn
the erroneous legal conclusion that they were engaged in a business.
Mr. Justice Black added that the reason the Court of Claims failed to
make a specific finding of fact that the executors were not carrying on
a business was "the result of the court's adoption of criteria of 'carrying
on . . . business' inconsistent with our holding in the Higgins case." 62
With due deference to the legal subtleties of Mr. Justice Black's opinion,
the practical result seems to be that taxpayers will not be able to deduct
expenses incident to investing their funds as business expenses. The
Supreme Court may characterize this as a question of fact. From the
taxpayer's point of view, however, it might apparently be just as well
a rule of law.
City Bank Farmers Trust Company v. Helvering followed the
same line. The trustees of several large trusts sought to deduct their
commissions from the trust income as business expenses. The Com.missioner and the Board of Tax Appeals refused to allow this. The
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals and the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Black again delivered the opinion
of a unanimous Court. Again he was careful to point out that the
Court was simply affirming a finding of fact by the Board of Tax
Appeals which was supported by evidence. He seems to admit, however, that there are certain legal conceptions involved in this finding of
fact which look like rules of law. Quoting from the Higgins case he
said: "The conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals 'is adequately supported by this record and rests upon a conception of carrying on business similar to that expressed by the Court for an antecedent section.'" 63
A word of caution may not be amiss in connection with the Higginscase. It has been widely assumed in view of that decision that if a
taxpayer's activities take the form of investing in real estate, his
expenses in this connection are business expenses which are deductible.
It should be noted, however, that this question was not before the Court.
62. 313 U. S. 127, 131 (1941).
63. 313 U. S. 2I, 126 (941).
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Before the Board of Tax Appeals the Commissioner conceded that that
part of the taxpayer's expenses referable to his real estate holdings were
deductible as business expenses. The concession was not litigated and
was not in issue when the case reached the Supreme Court. There may
be valid reasons for holding that expenses incurred in connection with
stocks and bonds are not business expenses, while those incurred in
connection with real estate are. In view of the Court's emphatic warnings, however, that what constitutes carrying on a business is a question
of fact and that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is not to be
reversed as long as it is sustained by evidence, it would appear to be
unwise to assume that the Court will surely hold that expenses connected
with real estate are business expenses, or reverse a possible ruling by
the Board or the Commissioner to the effect that they are not.
The other cases in connection with deductions were notable chiefly
because the Court decided them in favor of the taxpayers. Since 1921
the federal income tax has allowed life insurance companies to deduct
a certain percentage "of the mean reserve funds required by law." 64
In Helvering v. Oregon Mutual Life Insurance Co.,65 and a companion
case, Helvering v. Pan-American Life Insurance Co., "I the question
arose in connection with the 1932 67 and 1934 Acts,68 as to whether
this was limited to a percentage of reserves set aside to pay death benefits, or also included reserves, which life insurance companies were
required by law to maintain to cover disability in connection with combined policies of life, health and disability insurance. Without dissent
the Court held that the companies were entitled to deduct the statutory
percentage of both kinds of reserves. Mr. Justice Black pointed out
that the deduction not only fell within the literal wording of the statute,
but that the settled administrative practice from 1921 to 1934 had been

to allow the deduction of both kinds of reserves. Consequently, he said
that by the 1932 and 1934 Acts "Congress has granted life insurance

companies a deduction for disability reserves which only Congress can
take away" 69 and the Regulations interpreting these statutes to the
contrary were void.
7. Returns
The joint return of a husband and wife has bothered both the
Government and taxpayers for a long time, because it has not been clear,
and conflicting administrative interpretations have failed to make it
64. INT. REv. CODE, §203 (a) (2)
65. 311 U. S. 267 (1940).
66. 311 U.

(1939).

S. 272 (1940).

67. REvENuE Acr oF 1932, §203 (a) (2), 47 STAT. 224 (1932), 26 U.
§203 (a) (2) (940).
68. REVENuE Acr OF 1934, § 203 (a) (2), 48 STAT. 732 (1934).
69. 311 U. S. 267, 272 (1940).

S. C. A.
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clear, whether the income of the spouses should be treated as the income
of separate taxpayers or that of a single taxpayer. From this failure
to clarify the basic conception underlying such returns have arisen such
questions as whether the losses of one spouse may be offset against the
gains of the other; whether the fifteen per cent. limitation upon the
deduction of charitable contributions is to be measured by the aggregate
income of both spouses or by the separate income of the contributing
spouse; and, whether the earned income credit is to be computed according to the individual incomes of each spouse or the aggregate income of
both. The Supreme Court in a series of cases decided at the last term
seems to have put these questions at rest by definitely favoring the single
taxpayer, aggregate income concept.
Thus, for example, in Helvering v. Janney30 and Gaines v. Helvering 71 Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous court, 72 held
that upon a joint return the capital losses of one spouse might be offset
against the capital gains of the other. "We are of the opinion," the
Chief Justice said, "that under the provisions of the Act of 1934 as to
joint returns of husband and wife, which embodied a policy set forth in
substantially the same terms for many years, Congress intended to provide for a tax on the aggregate net income and that the losses of one
spouse might be deducted from the gains of the other; and that this
applied as well to deductions for capital losses as to other deductions." 73
In Taft v. Helvering'14 the Court took the same position. Husband
and wife filed a joint return in which the deduction for charitable contributions of the wife was based upon fifteen per cent. of their combined
income. The Commissioner contended that this was erroneous and
that the deduction for the wife's contributions should be reduced to
fifteen per cent. of her separate income. The Supreme Court, however,
once more in complete accord and speaking through the Chief Justice,
upheld the taxpayer. The federal income tax, said Chief Justice
Hughes, "provides specifically for the inclusion of the income of each
spouse 'in a single joint return' and in that case that 'the tax shall be
computed upon the aggregate income.' The principle that a joint return
is to be treated as the return of a 'taxable unit' and as though it were
made by a 'single individual' would be violated if in making a joint
return each spouse were compelled to calculate his or her charitable
contributions as if he or she were making a separate return. The prin70. 311 U. S. 189 (1940).

71. id.

72. Mr. Justice Roberts did not, however, 'participate in these cases.
73. 311 U. S. i89, 194 (1940).
74. 311 U. S. 195 (1940).
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ciple of a joint return permitted aggregation of income and deductions
and thus overrode the limitations incident to separate returns."

7r

Although in these cases the "principle that a joint return is to be
treated as the return of a taxable unit and as though it were made by
a single individual" worked to the advantage of the taxpayers, it will
not always do so. For example, in the past, when computing the earned
income credit of taxpayers filing a joint return, husband and wife have
been treated as separate taxpayers, with the result that where one of the
spouses had an unearned income he or she was allowed to treat it as
earned up to $3,000, regardless of the income of the other spouse. This
is no longer permissible under the prevailing concept that a joint return
78
is the single return of a single taxpayer.

Other interesting permutations of this problem may be easily
imagined. Suppose, for example, that a husband sells a thousand shares
of XYZ stock at a loss. The next day his wife buys a thousand shares
of XYZ stock. If they file a joint return may the husband deduct the
loss from the sale of his stock, or will this be treated as a wash sale? 77
Again suppose that a husband and wife each own $io,ooo principal
amount of United States Treasury Bonds. They file a joint return.
Are they entitled to exclude the income from $io,ooo worth of these
bonds, or only that from $5,000?

There was another case at the last term involving returns, which
raised the problem of the proper definition of a "first return" in connection with a statutory privilege to elect percentage depletion. Although
the case was decided by a unanimous court it seems needlessly harsh
and severe. The J. E. Riley Investment Company was engaged in
mining gold at Flat, Alaska. Because the winter mail service to that
point was so slow and uncertain, the company used the preceding year's
forms in filing its federal income tax returns. On January 2, 1935, it
executed its return for 1934 on a 1933 form, which had been forwarded

to it by the collector for that purpose. At that time the company was
unaware of a provision of the 1934 Act 78 under which it could have
elected to claim percentage depletion, and it had not been notified by the
collector of this ability to make election when he forwarded the 1933
form. If the company had been aware of it, it would have elected percentage depletion, since it had exhausted its depletion allowance on the
basis of cost. The return executed on January 2, 1935, reached the
75. Id. at i9g.
76. U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.25-2, as amended by T. D. 5057, July 2, 1941.
77. This was not treated as a wash sale by the Board of Tax Appeals prior to the
decisions in Helvering v. Janney, 311 U. S. 189 (194o), cited note 70 srupra, and Hel-

vering v. Taft, 31r U. S. 195 (I94O), cited note 74 supra. Frank B. Gummey, 26 B.
T. A. 894 (1932); see W. E. Brochon, 30 B. T. A. 4o4 (I934).
78. REVENUE Acr oF 1934, § 114 (b) (4), 48 STAT. 710 (1934).
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collector at Tacoma on January 29, 1935.

In August, 1935, the taxpayer learned for the first time of the provision in the 1934 Act authorizing percentage depletion. In consequence, on March 3, 1936, it filed
an amended return for 1934 claiming percentage depletion and asking
for a refund. The Commissioner denied the refund on the ground that
the taxpayer had failed to elect percentage depletion in its "first return"
filed under the 1934 Act, as required by that Act. In J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner,7 9 the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the position of the Commissioner. Mr. Justice Douglas said that by a
first return Congress meant an original return or an amended return
filed within the time for filing an original return. In support of this
conclusion he declared that if any other construction were placed upon
the law "taxpayers with the benefit of hindsight could shift from one
basis of depletion to another in light of developments subsequent to
their original choice." 80 This does not follow. There was no question
of any "original choice" by the taxpayer in this case. The Court admitted that if the taxpayer had known that it could claim percentage
depletion when it filed its return in January, 1935, it would have done
so. To the taxpayer's argument that it had been treated harshly and
that "equitable considerations should govern" in the construction of the
law, Mr. Justice Douglas coldly replied: "That may be the basis for
an appeal to Congress in amelioration of the strictness of that section.
But it is not ground for relief by the courts from the rigors of the
statutory choice which Congress has provided." 81 Surely, the Court
could have construed "first return" to mean the first return filed after
the taxpayer had had a reasonable opportunity to acquaint himself with
the provisions of the law. The Court has certainly been willing enough
to give an "equitable" construction to tax statutes when such a construction favored the Government. 82 There is no obvious reason for weighting the scales against the taxpayer.
8. Taxation of Partnerships
After the debacle in 1929 the revenue from the federal income tax
suffered considerably by reason of the fact that taxpayers sold their
deflated securities and realized huge tax losses. To cope with this situation Congress provided in the 1932 Act that losses from the sale of
securities, which did not constitute capital assets, could not be deducted
generally from gross income, but could be used merely as an offset
79. 311 U. S. 55 (,940).

8o. Id. at 59.
8i. Ibid.
82. E. g., Helvering v. Clifford, 3o9 U. S. 331 (1940).
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against gains from the sale of similar securities.8 3 In Neuberger v.
Commissioner8 4 the question arose as to whether this privilege of offsetting losses from the sale of noncapital securities extended to a partner's share of the partnership's gains from the sale of such securities, or
was limited to his individual gains. Neuberger had sold some of his
individual securities, which were not capital assets, at a loss. His distributive share of the income of a partnership included gains realized
by the partnership from the sale of similar securities. Under the present
law it is explicitly provided that capital gains and losses of a partnership are to be treated as the gains and losses of the individual partners.8 5
Moreover, there is no requirement that property be held for more than
two years in order to be a capital asset. Consequently, under the current
version of the income tax, there is no question but that a partner may
offset individual losses against partnership gains. The 1932 Act was
not, however, explicit upon this point. Under the 1932 Act it was
simply provided that a partnership should make an income tax return
upon which the partnership income should be computed like that of an
individual, and that the individual partners should return their distributive shares of the partnership income in their individual returns.8 6 The
Commissioner contended, therefore, that under the 1932 Act noncapital
losses of the partnership were to be offset against its noncapital gains
on the partnership return, and the individual partner could not utilize
the partnership gains again on his individual return as an offset against
his individual losses. Although three of the Justices agreed with the
Commissioner, the majority of the Court rejected this construction and
held that he had misinterpreted the 1932 law. Mr. Justice Murphy,
who delivered the majority opinion, declared that in limiting the deduction of noncapital losses, Congress merely intended to protect the tax
on ordinary income and did not intend to tax noncapital security gains
unless they exceeded noncapital losses. Although Congress under the
1932 Act recognized partnerships as business units to the extent of
requiring them to file informational returns, it also treated them as
associations of individuals by taxing the income from the partnerships
to the individual partners. Mr. Justice Murphy concluded, therefore,
that it was the intent of the law to allow individual losses to be offset
87
against partnership gains, a result eminently fair and sensible.
There was another decision on the taxation of partnerships at the
last term, which unlike the Neuberger case, is of practical significance
83.
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OF 1932, § 23 (r)

(1), 47 STAT. 169, 183 (1932).

84. 311 U. S. 83 (1940).
85. INT. REv. CODE, § 182 ('939).
86. REVmNUE Acr OF 1932, §§ 18I-I89, 47 STAT.

i6q, 222,

223 (1932).

87. Mosbacher v. United States, 311 U. S. 619 (194o), a memorandum decision
raised the same problem as Neuberger v. Comm'r, 311 U. S. 83 (I94O), cited note 84
supra, and was decided the same way upon the authority of that case.
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under the current law. This was Helvering v. Enright."" Enright at
the time of his death was a partner in a law firm. Both he and the firm
returned their income upon a calendar year and a cash receipts and disbursements basis. The articles of partnership provided that upon the
termination of the partnership by the death of a partner, his estate
should be entitled to a partner's percentage of the "net monies in the
treasury of the firm plus his like percentage in the outstanding accounts
and the earned proportion of the estimated receipts from unfinished
business." Uiider this provision Enright's interest in the uncollected
accounts of the firm was valued at $2,055.55 and his interest in the

firm's unfinished business, at $40,855.77. His executors included these
sums in Enright's estate tax return; but they did not include them in
the income tax return filed for him; nor, when they were collected were
these sums returned as part of the income of his estate. The Commissioner, consequently, determined an income tax deficiency on the basis
of section 42 of the 1934 Act, which requires income accrued at the
death of a taxpayer to be included in the income tax return filed for
him, even though he be on a cash basis. The Board of Tax Appeals
sustained the deficiency. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the Board, taking the view that section 42 simply requires
accrued income of a deceased partner to be included in his return, and
since Enright at the time of his death was not entitled to receive anything from the partnership except his proportionate share of the cash
receipts of the firm, this was all that accrued to him at his death. In
other words, the Circuit Court of Appeals said that section 42 requires
accrued income of a deceased partner to be included in his return, but
it does not require the accrued income of the partnership to be included
in the partner's return, when the partnership is on a cash basis. The
Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed the judgment
of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Reed said that the purpose
of section 42 is to prevent the escape of any income from the income tax
upon the death of a taxpayer. Consequently, he held that upon the death
of a partner not only must the income which has accrued to him be
included in his income tax return, but also his proportionate share of
the income which has accrued to the partnership. This brought him to
the problem of whether or not the disputed items in the instant case
could be properly said to have accrued to the partnership. Ordinarily
an item is held to accrue when the right to receive it becomes clear and
fixed. Under ordinary conceptions of accrual there was no difficulty,
therefore, in holding that the uncollected accounts of the partnership had
accrued. A more perplexing problem faced Mr. Justice Reed when he
88.
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undertook to show that anything accrued to the partnership with respect
to its unfinished business. , Starting from the premise that "accrue" has
not yet become a "word of art with a definite connotation when employed in describing items of gross income" 8 he said that it would be
necessary to determine its meaning in connection with section 42 in view
of the purpose behind that section. This purpose was to make sure that
income of decedents earned during their lives would be included in their
income tax returns, regardless of whether they reported their incomes
on a cash or accrual basis. Consequently, in connection with section 42
an item should be deemed to accrue when it was fairly susceptible of
valuation. "Accrued income under § 42 for uncompleted operations,"
said Mr. Justice Reed, "includes the value of the services rendered by
the decedent, capable of approximate valuation, whether based on the
agreed compensation or on quantum meruit. The requirement of valuation comprehends the elements of collectibility. The items here meet
these tests and are subject to accrual." oo
9. Administration and Procedure
An appellate court will not ordinarily consider an issue which has
not been raised in the court below. This is not, however, according to
the Supreme Court, an inflexible practice. "There may always be
exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to
consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon
by the court or administrative agency below." 91 Several cases in this
category occurred at the last term.
In Hormel v. Helvering 92 the petitioner created three trusts under
which the petitioner himself, and his wife as guardian for one of his
sons, were beneficiaries. Each trust was for a different son. Other
than this, however, their terms seem to have been identical. The subject
matter of each trust consisted of stock in the Geo. A. Hormel Co., of
which the petitioner was an officer. The trustees were the petitioner
and another named by the petitioner. The petitioner retained the power
to remove the co-trustee at any time, with the consent of his wife. The
terms of the trusts provided that the trustees should pay the ;ncome
from each of the trusts to the petitioner's wife, as guardian, up to
$2,000 a year, and any income in excess of this amount to the petitioner.
8g. Id. at 643.
go. Id. at 645. Pfaff v. Comm'r, 312 U. S. 646 (1941), presented the same problem as Helvering v. Enright, 312 U. S. 636 (194), cited note 88 supra, and was decided in the same way upon the authority of that case.
gi. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 557 (1941).
92.

Ibid.
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The trustees had power to appoint proxies to exercise the voting rights
connected with stock held in trust and they were also empowered to sell
the securities deposited with them and substitute others. It was further
provided that no trust estate should vest in the petitioner's wife, as
guardian, or in the named sons, that the wife and sons should have no
power to alienate or incumber their interests, and that the trustees should
be liable only for wilful and deliberate violation of their duties. The
trusts were to terminate in three years, or upon the prior death of the
petitioner, or of the son named under the trust. Upon the termination
of any trust, the trust property was to be paid over to the petitioner or
his representatives.

In 1934 and 1935 the income from the trusts was

paid to the petitioner's wife as guardian and the petitioner did not
include it in his .income tax returns. The Commissioner consequently
determined a deficiency against the petitioner on the theory that the
trusts were "revocable" trusts and under section 166 of the 1934 Act
he was properly taxable upon the income from them. The petitioner
appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals, where the Commissioner broadened his argument, contending not only that the income from the trusts
was taxable to the petitioner under section 166, but also under section
167 of the 1934 Act, which imposes a tax upon the creator of a trust
where the income of the trust may be accumulated for or distributed to
him in his discretion 'or in the-discretion of one who lacks a substantial
adverse interest in the trust. The Board ruled in favor of the taxpayer
that the income from the trusts was not taxable to him under either
section 166 or section 167. The Commissioner appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Before the Circuit Court of Appeals he abandoned
his reliance upon section 166, conceding that the trust was not a revocable trust. He contended, however, that the Board erred in holding that
the petitioner was not taxable under section 167. He also introduced
for the first time a new argument that irrespective of sections 166 and
167, the petitioner was taxable under section 22 (a), the section defining income generally. In other words, the Commissioner suited his
argument to and based it upon the decision in Helvering v. Clifford 93
which the Supreme Court had handed down by the time the Commissioner reached the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Board of Tax Appeals that the petitioner was not
taxable under sections 166 and 167. However, they allowed the Commissioner to introduce his new argument and held that the taxpayer was
taxable upon the income from the trusts under section 22 (a). The
taxpayer sought certiorari on the ground that the Circuit Court of
Appeals had erred in deciding the case on the basis of section 22 (a),
93. 309 U. S. 331 (94o).
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since this had not been raised by the Commissioner before the Board of
Tax Appeals. The Supreme Court, however, in a unanimous opinion
delivered by Mr. Justice Black, declared that the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals was correct and that this was one of the extraordinary
cases where an appellate court could properly decide a case upon an issue
not raised in the lower court. "Rules of practice and procedure," said
Mr. justice Black, "are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to
defeat them. A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under
which courts of review would invariably and under all circumstances
decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this policy. Orderly
rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental
justice."

94

Mr. Justice Black did not undertake a judicial blueprint of the
situations where "the fundamental rules of justice" require an appellate
court to make an exception to the "orderly rules of procedure," by considering an issue which was not raised below. Presumably the exceptional character of the exception precluded it. It seems, however, that
this is not a matter resting in the uncontrolled discretion of the appellate
body. Thus, for example, in Helvering v. Richtter,9 5 another short-term
family trust case, the Circuit Court of Appeals had refused to allow the
Commissioner who based his case before the Board of Tax Appeals on
sections I66 and 167 to shift his position and ground his argument on
Helvering v. Clifford.9 6 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals declaring that it should have considered
the case upon this basis.
There were two more cases involving the income tax which dealt
with procedural problems.

97
In United States v. A. S. Kreider Co.,

the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations governing a suit
initiated in a district court for the refund of income taxes, was the five
year limitation of section 1113 (a) of the 1926 Act, rather than the
six year period allowed by section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code. In
this case the taxpayer in 1921i paid an income tax for the year 1920 of
$52,481.07. Prior to June 15, 1926, it executed a waiver extending the

time for audit and assessment of additional taxes until December 31,
1926.

On July 26, 1926, the taxpayer paid a deficiency assessment of

$1,362.50. On March 3, 1929, however, it filed a claim for a refund
of $53,844.47, the entire amount of the taxes paid with respect to 1920.
The Commissioner found that the taxpayer had overpaid its 1920 tax
94. 312 U. S. 552, 557 (1941).
95. 312 U. S. 561 (194i).
96. 309 U. S. 554 (1940).
97. 313 U.
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in the sum of $14,833.68 and in October, 1929, he sent it a certificate
of over-assessment for this amount. Upon the certificate there was,
however, a notation to the effect that $13,471.18 of the overpaid taxes

were barred by the statute of limitations, and the check accompanying
the certificate, which the taxpayer apparently accepted, was simply for
the residue, $1,362.50.

On March

2,

1932, the taxpayer sued in a

district court to recover the sum withheld by the Commissioner. The
question arose whether the suit was timely. The District Court held
that the action was barred by section 1113 (a) of the 1926 Act, which
prescribes the period in which suits for refunds of income taxes must
be brought. The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the District
Court and held that the action was timely, since it was governed by
section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code, which allows six years in which
to bring suit in a district court. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision, held that the conclusion of the District Court was correct and
reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice
Murphy pointed out that section 24 (20) of the Judicial Code was
simply an outside limitation on bringing suits for refunds in the district
courts, which was controlled by the specific provisions of section
1113 (a) of the 1926 Act relating to refunds. He also said that the
taxpayer could not avoid the limitation imposed by section 1113 (a) on
the ground that the transactions with the Commissioner in 1929
amounted to an account stated, since the refusal of the Commissioner
to refund part of the overpaid taxes imported no promise to pay them,
which is the basis of an account stated.
In the last income tax case the Supreme Court agreed that a collector cannot release a surety from liability on a bond to pay an income
tax deficiency and interest on the deficiency. They could not agree,
however, where a collector had attempted to waive the interest provided
for in such a bond, upon the rules governing the allowance of interest
upon this sum. In Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States,9" the Commissioner in 192o assessed a taxpayer for $29,128 for additional 1917
income taxes. The taxpayer filed a claim for abatement of the assessment and, to secure suspension of the collection of the tax, executed a
bond for $38,oo conditioned upon payment of the deficiency and
interest on May 2, 1923. The Commissioner allowed the claim in
abatement except for principal of $8,233.38 and interest of $4,169.07.

On demand by the collector, the Royal Indemnity Company, surety on
the bond, paid only the principal amount and not the interest. Payment
was made by draft, which recited that it was in full payment of the
tax and all liability upon the bond. Although the collector accepted the
98. 313 U. S. 289 (1941).
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draft and surrendered the bond, the United States later brought suit in
a district court to recover the interest which had not been paid. The
District Court allowed the recovery of $4,i69.o7, the interest provided
for in the bond, but refused to allow interest on this sum. The Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that interest should have been allowed on the
interest provided for in the bond at 6 per cent., the rate fixed by section
37o of the New York General Business Law, the state where the suit
was brought. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the majority, said
that the collector had no power to release a tax obligation owing to the
government, since only the Commissioner can compromise such claims.
The Circuit Court of Appeals acted properly, moreover, in allowing
interest upon the interest stipulated for in the bond. This was not
interest upon interest, but interest upon a sum which the defendant was
under a contractual duty to pay. As to the rate of interest which should
have been allowed, this, said Mr. Justice Stone, is a question for the
federal courts to decide, rather than a matter of state law. However, in
the absence of a federal rule, the Circuit Court of Appeals acted properly
in adopting the rate prescribed by the New York General Business Law.
Mr. Justice Black agreed with the majority of the Court that a
collector has no power to waive a tax obligation owing to the government and that it was, therefore, entitled to recover the interest due on
the deficiency assessed by the Commissioner. He doubted, however,
whether it was proper to allow interest upon -this sum. Moreover, he
felt that if interest were to be allowed, the federal courts should set
their own rule and prescribe a uniform rate of interest, so that all taxpayers would be treated equally. Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Murphy concurred in Mr. Justice Black's views.
(To be concluded.)

